Site Section Links
KRONOS Vol V, No. 1
INHERENT ORIGINS OF THE STATE (HEGEL AND FREUD)
This is the second in a series of three articles dealing with the general theme of the Hegelian origins of Freud's social and political philosophy. The first article "Group Mind in Development" (KRONOS IV:4) – dealt with what I called Freud's "phylogenic and ethnogenic dialectic," the psychological growth of mankind into the form of the modern state. This second article presents an exposition of Hegel's social and political philosophy so as to find the roots and paradigm of Freud's theory. It also attempts to show in what ultimate respects and conclusions Hegel's views may or may not coincide with Freud's. The last article in the series – "Self-consciousness as the Hegelian Source of the World View in Freud" – will argue first that Hegel's philosophy (and no other) is in fact the appropriate progenitor of Freud's and, second, that the ultimate subject and common paradigm of all their common philosophical speculations is the movement to self-consciousness of the individual mind.
For Hegel, the state is the objective nexus in which a given living, historical individual comes to his own concrete self-consciousness and reality through a process we may call "ontogeny" – the origination and development of the individual person. Yet this individual development can only be understood through other, larger processes which together go to make up the whole in which the individual dwells. This whole, or collective, in terms of which and through which the individual is reflected and realizes himself, is society and the state. Hegel viewed the structure of a state and society as the embodiment of a given historical people's will and destiny. The origination and development of such a particular state, wherein a given people's will and destiny is embodied, is delineated through a process which we may call Hegel's "ethnogeny". Thirdly, since the State per se is a perennial institution (embodying in its structure many historical forms and group destinies), it is an entity which itself originates and undergoes a development which we may call its "phylogeny". Finally and most comprehensively, however, as a portion of the whole of Hegel's understanding of reality's self construction, the state appears as the final step in the relationalization and concretization (in objective form) of Spirit, the infinite creative life which is thought (i.e. realized) by thought as it thinks through and as it becomes the dialectical and systematic unity of all things. This life of Spirit is Hegel's "cosmogeny".
Before we turn to an in depth analysis of the dialectical integration and operation of these four processes or levels which together compose the inherent origins of the state, we can see that, from an overall point of view, on the one hand, Hegel's social and political philosophy can be understood to be a critique of traditional (especially Enlightenment) theories of the state (culminating in the French Revolution). These generally hold that the structures of state and society are conscious and deliberate inventions for practical purposes. Collectively, they constitute a view which derives from an understanding of man as everywhere and always the same, viz., rationally pursuant of his own ends as determined by his own personality. Since time, tradition, and other environmental factors are only "accidental circumstances," the ideal state can be constructed for all men. The only problem, then, is to adjust men's mutual relations in society such that their "subjective freedom," their pursuit of personal ends, does not come into opposition, and thus the good of each and the whole can be obtained. This is a problem which is traditionally resolved by a social contract theory (which comes to its fruition in Rousseau).
Such a traditionally "liberalistic" view as we have described, which is, according to Hegel, the theoretical source of all "anarchic liberalism," invariably finds its practical conclusion in absolute totalitarianism. The view of freedom which underlies such a political philosophy is "false". It supposes a state of nature in which abstract freedom ("license"), plunged into the Natural without self-reflection and without specific conditions to make it meaningful, is transformed into concrete or subjective freedom under law according to always reconstitutable contractual channels. Such a view is limited.
Actual or rational freedom is impossible without accounting for the history of customs and institutions presented by a given collective situation. The state as the highest totality of objective Spirit is not an artificial body by conscious construction and not founded upon a contract specifying a set of formal governmental and social institutions. Thus, what of these latter can be instituted or changed at any given moment is strictly limited. Furthermore, we cannot seek the moral first principles of the ideal state and then justify or condemn given examples on this criterion. One can only explain the inherently rational mechanisms which bring it about. Men and states are not everywhere and always the same in any important respect; and there can be no ideal model of either. Apparent differences are real and their systematic understanding constitutes not the chronicle but the dialectical science of history.
The historical understanding of a state is the science of a people in that process in which (and in accordance with the necessary laws of which) it realizes and unfolds its unique contribution to the whole of human civilization, and ultimately fulfills the role it plays in Spirit's coming to its own self-consciousness in the objective mode. A philosophy of the state must be, then, as Hegel says, "poles apart from an attempt to construct a state as it ought to be . . . only show how the state, the ethical universe, is to be understood".(2)
On the other hand, traditionalism and positive law theories of the state, which view its laws, customs, and institutions as nothing but an incremental collection of past precedents handed down by tradition, is for Hegel a view equally erroneous. Positive law and traditionalism do not constitute a philosophy of the state and cannot even explain, much less justify, it. In itself, it is found to be nothing but a sum, an incoherent heap, of private and public laws, customs, and institutions, which, due to the development of a given people in history, usually renders both theoretically and practically a chaotic and invalid account of the political and social organization of this people.
True, as Hegel's two most famous political aphorisms declare: "the march of God in the world, that is what the state is" and "what is rational is actual."(3) But, as Kaufmann and Avineri have made clear in each case, this does not mean either that any given state is the direct or immediate expression of the will of God (such that, e.g., Hegel would be here re-introducing some notion of the divine right of kings or governments) or that whatever social and political structures there may be at any given time are by the very fact of their being for that reason justified rationally (for by "actual" Hegel does not mean the conglomerate appearance of the totality of what is present at hand but rather the inner logical core which reason penetrates and reconciles with appearance).(4) Civil society, made up of individuals, does display them in the self-reliant and self determinate pursuit of self-interest. Channels of action are in fact prescribed by deliberate law and contract; and we can say, in any given case, what its rational (i.e., aeteological and teleological) superstructures are.
Thus, on the one hand, Hegel shares with the Enlightenment the view that the state is essentially reasonable and explicable. He believes, furthermore, that in the course of history civilization is moving along the path of a greater rationality and truth. This is the libertarian strain in Hegel's thought (and combined with other elements becomes the basis of "left-wing" Hegelianism). On the other hand, Hegel does not believe that an ideal state can be either thought up and then put into effect or that the inner compulsion of Spirit's own dialectic in the state can be retarded or advanced by deliberate choice. The past is never totally annihilated, the future cannot be prophesied, the present cannot be altered. This is the conservative strain in Hegel's thought (and, combined with an emphasis upon the permanence and durability of the present notional stage of the Zeitgeist, becomes the basis of "right-wing" Hegelianism). Looked at either as a practical dilemma or as a theoretical contradiction, this duality of his thinking can be seen as the source of all Hegel's social and political writings, for his philosophy is an attempt to resolve this conflict by showing the intrinsic inseparability and ultimate identity of these antitheses.
Let us now recall the whole of the origination of the state, which is based upon a "movement" through these antitheses by means of the ontogenic, ethnogenic, phylogenic, and cosmogenic analyses. For Hegel, Spirit (consciousness or mind or the whole life of thought) is, in its first cosmogenic moment (at the beginning of history), nothing at all. It only becomes what it is through the process of history and its own inner compulsion to be and know itself as what it is. Here Spirit is pure subjectivity without a subject; it is, in itself, abstract, empty, and without integration or differentiation; it is ignorant. But consciousness proceeds to move through its dialectic. "Consciousness we find distinguishes from itself something," as Hegel puts it in the Phenomenology, "to which at the same time it relates itself; or to use the current expression, there is something for consciousness; and the determinate form of this process of relating . . . is knowledge."(5 )
The political and social stage of the dialectic of Spirit is called "Objective Spirit"; and may, in accordance with the division of the Encyclopedia, be placed in the middle of the last of the three great divisions of Hegel's philosophy (i.e., between Subjective Spirit and Absolute Spirit, all within the Philosophy of Spirit, which follows both the Philosophy of Logic and the Science of Nature).
This stage is the subject of The Philosophy of Right. Consciousness is here becoming what it is through relating to what it is not, as always, but in accordance with the special features of what Hegel calls the "system of right," "the realm of freedom made actual, the world of mind brought forth out of itself like a second nature".(6) The ego here is "the transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy to the differentiation, determination, and position of a determinacy as a content and object.... through this positing of itself as something determinate, the ego steps in principle into determinate existence".(7) The will of this ego is "not something complete and universal prior to its determining itself and prior to its superseding and idealizing this determination. The will is not a will until it is this self-mediating activity, this return to itself".(8) This is the process of the free mind – "to make freedom its object, i.e., to make freedom objective as much in the sense that freedom shall be the world system of mind, as in the sense that this system shall be the world of immediate actuality".(9) Thus, "right" is here understood as "an existent of any sort embodying the free will".(10)
The dialectical process of consciousness actualizing its will as right can be reconstructed schematically as follows. Consciousness, recognizing its immediate separateness form objective Nature, has the need to overcome and integrate it within itself. This expresses itself in abstract right, the subjective will (freedom) externalizing itself in action by taking possession of some particular external object. The ego first starts becoming itself by overcoming Natural difference through devouring and thus destroying what is external. The object is negated as separate, and satisfaction together with self-definition is achieved. This first stage is highly limited, however, because the object, and therefore its overcoming, is particular and transitory. Consciousness moves on, then, to the relations of property. Here Nature is appropriated as consciousness's own way of preserving it in its separateness and marking it as "mine". This relation requires restraint and the foregoing of immediate desire. The relation transforms mere possession (a personal attribute) into property (a social attribute of the thing) because, for the first time, the consciousness of other consciousnesses is required. Property thus becomes "the embodiment of personality" and the recognition of other egos as the delimitors and guarantors of it.(11) Contract between persons here emerges to solidify the objective relation between natural objects and the subjective relation between egos.
This joint appropriation and joint abnegation regarding the community of things issues in a theoretical construct, "the general will"; and this, in turn, gives birth to the notion of morality – viz., the concept of wrong as the necessary conflict between particular wills and the general will. Personal right in principle is "wrong" insofar as it must offend against the general will. The demonstration of the nullity of such wrong can only be achieved by objective cancellation (retribution), and this fact is presently seen to be the only just recognition of the free will implicitly demanded by the "wrongdoer" himself. The source of all morality, then, is understood by Hegel to be an interiorization of the general will, a self-determination by internalization of the intersubjective "Not". But morality as the self-determined will, internalizing purpose or intention in conscience and guilt, is soon seen to be insufficient because it is purely formal (i.e., Kantian). We are thrust outward again to the property relation from which morality issues. Returning to this relation of property, the particular relations existing between subject and object are soon seen to be arbitrary. This means that there is here an unlimited and accidental resolution of the mind's struggle for self-recognition in other minds and in Nature (i.e., "Why does 'x' belong to 'A' and not to 'B' in accordance with the inner nature of each?"). It is labor and creativity which now transform and transcend the accidentality of property.
Labor holds up to consciousness an object not to be devoured, used, or left with the mark of mere formal intersubjective recognition; "to be desired not through negation but through re-creation". The energetic task of "labor is therefore always intentional, not instinctual, for it represents man's power to create his own world". And hence, for Hegel, labor can be seen as "the sub-limation of primitive enjoyment".(12) Yet, though labor is self-realization through self externalization (Entaüsserung), it can be the source of greatest alienation (Entfremdung). For, as we shall shortly see, in Civil Society (Bürgerliche Gesellschaft), one comes to produce in accordance with a reciprocal relation with others. This reciprocal relation is premised on a division of labor which all too easily makes an individual's products not the manifestation of his own needs and nature (the expression of his own person).
Rather, an individual's products (in the early stages of this relation) become dependent upon and express the person and will of the master in the master/slave relationship or (later) dependent upon and therefore expressive of the requirements of overall social production per se. By laboring for the abstract power of the market (thereby I am reduced to this very abstraction), creative consciousness and self knowledge are transformed into mechanical deadness and self oblivion.
Social and political institutions have a prior source, a form anterior to both the organization of the Civil Society and the State proper, which forms the first stage of Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) – viz, the family. The family is the immediate internal and natural state, according to Hegel, the undifferentiated unity of concrete ethical substance, the ground which makes "The State" (sensu stricto) possible. The family is the first form of human spirit's issuance out of itself, wherein the members of the family are considered as one and united by love.(13) Thus, this purely natural union and expression of personality in a proto-state can be seen as a more concrete overcoming of abstract right and morality. The single person's will which is expressed in property is here expressed in the common property of the family. But the natural dissolution of the family (e.g., the growing up of the children) results in the appearance of independent persons and the atomistic need-state of the Civil Society. This is the state as external state, a conglomerate of legal persons each attempting to realize his own private ends and regulated for efficiency by laws and institutions. It is the concrete and external form of the various property and labor relations discussed above. It is the source of contract, law, and justice. It is that "aspect of the modern state which secures its citizens an area of independent activity, enables them to pursue subjective ends as they see fit, and gives them the opportunity of the ethical, intellectual, and practical training which they need in order to become members of the state sensu stricto".(14)
The structures of Civil Society have utilitarian value in that the social relations present in it rest on the self-reliance of the population and thus create active self-awareness. It also guarantees the democratic and libertarian element of Hegel's political philosophy. Yet, this Civil Society is in need of restraint and control, because it is not "rational" enough as a coordinated whole. It needs to be and will be transcended in such a way that, on the one hand, the individual's personality in terms of property, labor, and creativity is not obliterated by alienation. On the other hand, its laws and institutions need not be thought of as existing solely for the securing of private interests, but rather as the expression of a concrete common good with which the private has been absolutely integrated.
Thus, the last stage of Ethical Life is the exposition of the State proper. We need not enter the details of Hegel's discussion of the bureaucracy, the estates, the legislature, constitutional law, etc. The significant and last feature of the State is, however, the "Crown". This entity is the source of the state's absolute integration of its constituents. It is the monarch who is the center of the state's power and authority (though constitutionally conditioned by the state? as determined in the prior stages of the dialectic). As Hegel describes the monarch, since the modern state is based on subjective self determination, there must be a real expression of this subjectivity in the objective institutions of the state. This real expression is the monarch – he is both the essential last step and also almost superfluous as the symbolic synthetic unity of all subjective freedom within the whole. The hereditary monarch is the last "moment of individuality" which supersedes the legislative (the power to establish and determine the universal) and the executive (the power to subsume the particular under the universal). This hereditary monarch expresses the final will of Objective Spirit in the form of the state with the power of ultimate subjective decision. For Hegel, this one man (the great leader, the personal bearer of the Zeitgeist and the Volkgeist – the phylogenic and ethnogenic levels of the dialectic respectively) fulfills that function within the whole of Objective Spirit, without which neither social contract nor military might, neither the calculations of reason nor the subjective bond of morality, could ground the state.
Thus, ultimately, the state proper overcomes all apparent contradiction by integrating all previous stages of action and kinds of consciousness into a meaningful whole while still maintaining all these earlier forms, which now become legitimized differentiations within it.
The Hegelian view of the state described above is the state seen essentially "cosmogenically, " as an institution built up through Spirit's thrust towards self-realization within the whole of reality. Of course, the development of the state per se is and has a dialectical evolution through history as well. It is this as a permanent entity going through the stages of its own phylogeny and as the form of a particular people engaging in their own ethnogeny. And, if one looks at the history of this phylogenic development of the state as such as Hegel expresses this in The Philosophy of History – one finds that
This phylogenic dialectic of the whole history of human self-consciousness in the particular objective realm of the state is obviously reduplicated on each ontogenic level as well. This is because, as a private person, the individual begins under the aegis of the family father, moves outward toward the community of equals within the libertarian sphere, and finally is retrieved as himself within the whole and as the whole in the form of the monarch (with whom and in whom he sees his own identity).
Having mapped out the Hegelian social and political schema of the inherent origins of the state and having in the first article in this series formulated Freud's phylogenic and ethnogenic dialectic of its origins, we may now make explicit the fundamental principles which underlie them both, finding in their metaphysical pre-suppositions the basis of their ultimate agreement as well as their differences.
In the long run, both Freud and Hegel (though recognizing it as an ineluctable component of any modern state) speak against the traditional Enlightenment view which holds that the state or society is the result of a contract which is both arbitrary and instrumental and which is guided by enlightened self-interest. For Freud, the primitive mind is imperishable and therefore "there is no such thing as eradicating" fundamental primitive instincts which an individual inherits from the collective past.(16) Consequently, there can be no re-making or overcoming of this "givenness" imposed upon the state by the dialectical forces of history and psychological necessity – even with the most rational and self-conscious of schemes. In fact, Freud goes so far as to put it succinctly thus: "You nourish the illusion of there being such a thing as psychological freedom and you will not give it up."(17) Yet, at the same time, Freud believes in the possibility of social and political amelioration through science and reason. And he even believes in the possibility of a rather Platonic "psychotherapist" of society, at least by implication. As in Hegel's case, then, Freud's political and social philosophy is neither inherently "liberal" nor "conservative". Rather, it is neither and both.
Furthermore, the overall cast of Freud's philosophy is ethically neutral. Neither philosopher presents us with a "moral philosophy"; and since both seem to collapse the "is/ought" distinction, it is difficult even to describe them as "moralists". Both of them view freedom in terms of the resolution or overcoming of internal conflict. This freedom is viewed as necessarily both created and sublated through externalization rather than understood in terms of the removal of external restraint upon a monadically pure subjectivity. It is difficult to place moral blame or praise upon the necessary resolution of a necessary conflict. Whether its subject is the individual or the state, as Freud puts it, "analysis makes for unity but not necessarily for goodness".(18) For Freud, ultimate ends and values can only be grounded in a religious system. And, since all religious systems are merely mass delusional remouldings of reality, it seems that Freud has theoretically excluded the possibility of absolute ethical judgment.
But passing now from these general similarities to the fundamental issue at hand, we may recollect that the general tenor of Freud's social and political philosophy is "pessimistic" whereas Hegel's is "optimistic". Whereas Hegel believes the state represents, in the course of its positive evolution, the ultimate objective rationalization of Spirit in the form of some given nation (even if not yet an actual fact), Freud believes the state in its final form is ridden by destructive forces. These forces are both intrinsically ineradicable and unrationalizable. And the dialectic of the state's origination, through the group mind identification mechanism, represents a regressive mode of the being of self-consciousness.
In the discussion of the union of the ontogenic and phylogenic streams of the Freudian and Hegelian dialectic, certain basic metaphysical presuppositions regarding the nature of reality itself are involved. Namely, the question of cosmology and of the ultimate subject of philosophical speculation are determinant for the final appraisal of state and society as given by Freud and Hegel. Let us now see how this is so.
Freud's most mature theory of the instincts posits two basic types Eros (Love/Life) and Thanatos (Division/Death). On the ontogenic level all individual behavior can be seen as the result of these antithetical impulsions. It is always on the ontogenic level that the dialectic is first applied. Yet Freud also imagines that these two forces operate in the world generally as phylogenic principles in the evolution of human self-consciousness. Thus, he claims, "civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and, after that, families, then, races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind".(19) To this instinct and its work (within the individual and collective psyche) is opposed the death instinct. The latter endeavors to destroy living substance and inhibit the combination of individuals; it is a "contrary instinct seeking to dissolve those units and to bring them back to their primeval, inorganic state".(20) The life and growth of the individual within the state and of the state itself can be seen as the "struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species".(21)
Though Freud does not explicitly so state, these two forces seem (particularly in his last works) to constitute cosmogenic principles. These cosmogenic principles appear to operate within a cosmic dialectic – above and beyond the phylogenic, ethnogenic, and ontogenic ones.(22) Thus, Freud speaks of the power of Eros "which holds together everything in the world". He speaks of Thanatos as a force which is its equal and opposite and which "shares world dominion with Eros". He characterizes their antagonism as "this battle of the giants".(23) It may be said, therefore, that Freud's social and political philosophy rests upon a kind of "restoration" (as Rieff puts it) of the cosmology of Empedocles (of which, by the way, Freud himself was in part aware).(24) It consequently "appears" that Freud's most comprehensive scheme corresponds to the Hegelian insofar as Freud's also constitutes the rationalization of the totality of what is, a cosmogenic and teleological ontology.
However, Freud's scheme really does not correspond to Hegel's here. And the reason why it does not, is also the reason why Freud's final view of the state and society differs from Hegel's.
If we recall the main thesis of Civilization and Its Discontents, we can see this clearly. The socialization of the individual within the state is described there as occurring in such a way that the outward manifestation of aggressiveness which the individual must inhibit within the community becomes transformed into guilt. This is achieved by aggression being introjected, through the super-ego, against the ego. The threatened, external unhappiness which would fall upon the individual who (without this inhibition) would seek to manifest his innate (death) instincts of aggression by opposing the Erotic directives of the civilization process is thereby "exchanged for a permanent internal unhappiness".(25) This unconscious heightening of the sense of guilt appears as malaise, and is the price paid, in individual terms, for "every advance in civilization". It is as if, with each success of Eros in the cosmos, Thanatos must receive an equal and opposite compensation. This dysfunction, which appears in the Hegelian dialectic as alienation, corresponds in the Freudian dialectic, to malaise. But while in the Hegelian scheme alienation is merely a stage to be overcome (sublated) by the State, in the Freudian, malaise is not overcome (sublimated). It is, on the contrary, the very condition of sublimation which makes the state possible.
Freud's Eros and Thanatos therefore do not meld into one ultimate synthetic unity themselves as do Hegel's antithetical notions. This is because, in Freud, they always reside in original immediacy in the individual (the unconscious or id). The perfect union of public and private remains unachieved. Indeed, unlike Hegel, there remains, in the end, a permanent unconscious element in Mind, rather than a fully transparent and rational lucidity. It may be said that this is primarily due to the fact that the ultimate subject and focus of the Hegelian system is the self-knowledge of Spirit, whereas, in the Freudian, it is the (primarily erotic) satisfaction of the individual. Therefore, since the former is essentially universal while the latter is necessarily particular, the full expansion (the self realization within the whole) of consciousness is impossible in Freud. Or, to put it another way, Freud is always a therapist. The return to the individual and his private happiness or unhappiness remains paramount. Therefore, the theoretical jump to the universal level (where the dialectic would fully rationalize and complete the evolutionary process) seemed to Freud to be a kind of wish-fulfillment. Perhaps this wish-fulfillment was the Eros of the philosopher, which Freud tended to treat with skepticism, because of his positivistic bias.
Structurally, however, there occurs in Freud no final synthesis because the subjective immediacy of Eros and Thanatos within the individual psyche can never be overcome. His dialectic cannot permit sufficiently stable mediation through "aufgehoben" notions, entities, or institutions to achieve this. The factual "fons et origo" of his whole dialectic is the individual ego and not the "world soul" in spite of what his theoretical postulates may have required.
Therefore, history (as an evolutionary force) and the state (as the unification of private persons into public being) do not, for Freud, have the final word. Rather, it is the ever-present and ever re-evocable past in its untransformed purity and the private individual which end the dialectic. Unlike Hegel, for Freud "what is definitive for the public and the social is the private and pathological,"(26) a relation which is just the reverse of the Hegelian. For in Hegel, as Rieff points out, "public contexts are autonomous and supreme as systems of causation" and the consideration of personality "excludes the so-called psychological view".(27)
Thus, though one could claim that Freud's inability to reconcile the individual with the state is due to his "libertarian" (or, as sometimes said, his "bourgeois") viewpoint, this really misses the philosophical point. This inability (if "inability" it may be called) must be attributed rather to his concerns as a therapist, one who encounters the individual unable to make such a reconciliation himself. But even more fundamentally, the irreducibility of the private and public in Freud's philosophy, the claim that the state-consciousness is regressive, and the disavowal of the possibility of the fully realized and translucent (shall we say "happy"?) self-consciousness is due above all to his positivistic metaphysical presuppositions which cannot countenance a cosmogenic dialectic which would sublate and integrate the ontogenic, ethnogenic and phylogenic dialectics into an indivisible whole.
In a sense, we can see Freud's social and political philosophy as speaking against the Hegelian scheme in the tradition of the Young Hegelians and of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Marx. Marx, like Freud, is heir to what Hegel would have called "subjectivist philosophy". This is so to the extent that both at least begin their philosophizing by looking at the individual's liberty in opposition to the oppressiveness of the state as such. They ask: how much (given the real needs and actual nature of living human beings) can the state demand? But Marx ultimately follows Hegel not only in his eschatological vision, but in his "anti-psychological" orientation. Though Hegel, unlike Marx, was willing to deal with the psychic apparatus, he would do so only so long as it became sufficiently universal such that personalities could become manifestations of objective social conditions on a universal plane (e.g., in Hegel, capitalists may be "personified capital" but not the objective result of the "anal character" as in Freud). Yet Freud, unlike Marx, ultimately looks at the state from the point of view of enlightened self-interest and asks: how much may the individual find in the state, insofar as, in its wholeness, the individual seeks to maximize his individual happiness?
Hegel, Marx, and Freud all share the social and political idealism of the Enlightenment which envisioned "a community of men who had subordinated their instinctual life to the dictatorship of reason".(28) Hegel saw this state of affairs as immanent through the dialectical universalization of subject and object, private and public, which were but fully realized corollaries of each other. Marx saw it as immanent through the dialectical universalization of objective and public economic conditions, of which the psychic realm and self conscious subject were but epiphenomena. Since the dialectical universalization and rationalization of subjective forces of Eros and Thanatos remained incomplete due to their immanent, ineradicable, irrational and individualized presence in each particular person, Freud saw these goals as a barely possible dream. Yet, Freud also understood that this "community of men who had subordinated their instinctual life to the dictatorship of reason" was a dream which was impossible to forget.
. . . to be continued.
REFERENCES1. Empedocles (Fr. 17,1.6, Simplicius, Physics, 158,6).
2. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. by T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1942), p. 11.
3. Ibid., pp. 10 and 279.
4. Cf. Walter Kaufmann, ed., Hegel's Political Philosophy (N. Y., 1970), p. 279; Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (London, 1972), pp. 123-28 and 175-78.
5. The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. by J. B. Baille, 2nd ed. rev. (London, 1961), p. 139.
6. Philosophy of Right, p. 20.
7. Ibid., p. 22.
8. Ibid., p. 24.
9. Ibid., p. 32.
10. Ibid., p. 33.
11. Ibid., p. 45.
12. Avineri, p. 89.
13. Cf. Ibid., p. 22 and Philosophy of Right, p. 261.
14. "Preface" by Z. A. Pelczynski in Knox and Pelczynski, eds., Hegel's Political Writings (Oxford, 1964), p. 120.
15. Avineri, p. 110.
16. Cf. Freud, On Creativity and the Unconscious, p. 213.
17. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, in SE, XV, 49.
18. Quoted in Jones, Life, II, 182.
19. S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. and ed. by James Strachey (N. Y., 1961), p. 69.
20. Ibid .
21. Ibid .
22. Cf. Rieff, Freud, pp. 31 and 378.
23. Group Psychology, p. 24; Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 69.
24. Cf. Rieff, Freud, p. 378, ftn.
25. Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 75.
26. Ibid .
27. Rieff, Freud, pp. 233-34.
28. "Why War?" in SE, XXII, p. 213.